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I. INTRODUCTION
The Anglo-American system of jurisprudence has greatly expanded the
ability of an injured party to recover in virtually every area of tort.1 However,
for every attempt to expand liability and compensation for an injured party,
there has been some faction which cries "enough, to extend liability any further
will do more harm than go9d." 2 The continuity of enterprise exception to the
traditional doctrine of non-liability of successor corporations3 in product
liability suits is an excellent example of an attempt to further expand liability
which is meeting considerable resistance.4
See generally GEORGE C. CHRISTE & JAMEs E. MEEKS, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS. chs. 7, 8, 9 & 12 (2d ed. 1990) (These chapters deal with expansion of
the law, and resistance to this expansion, in the following areas: failure to aid, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, strict liability, products liability and fetal injury.).
2 A good example is Lord Abinger's opinion in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
109 (Exech. 1842). In this case Lord Abinger was dealing with the now universally
accepted practice of allowing recovery by an individual not in privity of contract with the
manufacturer. Lord Abinger stated:
There is no privity of contract between [the plaintiff and the defendant]; and if the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was
injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine
the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, as to which I can see no limit would ensue.
In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), denying the
right of privacy to a woman whose likeness had been reproduced without her consent, Chief
Judge Parker stated that a "vast field of litigation... would necessarily be opened up
should this court hold that privacy exists as a legal right...." 1d. at 443; see also
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) (discusses the abandonment of the
traditional rule of inability to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress);
AIG Issues Forum, Why Reforming Our Liability System Is Fsential !f America Is To
Succeed In Overseas Marketls, TIME, FEB. 3, 1992, at 34-35.
3 The term "successor corporation," for the purposes of this Case Comment, is
defined as a corporation that has acquired all, or any part, of a pre-existing corporation (m a
cash-for-assets transaction). It does not, as is generally the case, imply the assumption of
rights and obligations of the corporation being succeeded. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1431 (6th ed. 1990).
4 See Carol A. Rogala, Nontraditional Successor Product Liability: Should Society Be
Forced To Pay The Cost?, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 37 (1990).
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Consider the following set of facts:5 P, a health conscious individual,
decides to purchase a treadmill from corporation D, the designer,
manufacturer, and marketer of the treadmill. A few years later, corporation D
sells all of its assets to corporation E in a cash-for-assets transaction. 6
Corporation D then quietly dissolves. Subsequently P, our plaintiff, is severely
injured while making an adjustment to the treadmill.
Under traditional rules of corporate successor liability, corporation E
cannot be held liable for the torts of its predecessor, corporation D.7 There are
four well recognized exceptions to this rule,8 but none of them is applicable
here.9 The result is the inequitable situation that P, through no fault of his own,
has been seriously injured and now has no party from whom he may seek
5 These facts are based on the facts of Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md.
1991). See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
6 Cash-for-assets sales have traditionally received different treatment than sales of
assets in which payment is in the form of stock of the buying corporation. This distinction
has generally been justified on the grounds that in cash-for-assets sales the "two
corporations... were strangers before the sale and continued to remain strangers after the
sale...." McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 104 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970), affid, 288 A.2d 585 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972). The argument continues that
in sales of assets for stock the shareholders of the first corporation become, in effect,
shareholders of the second corporation.
At least one court has questioned this distinction stating that "the absence of an
exchange of stock should not be conclusive. The presence of stock as consideration should
be one factor to use to determine whether there exists a sufficient nexus between the
successor and predecessor corporations to establish successor liability." Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976).
7 Howard L. Shecter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Whthout Successor Liability: Is It A
Myth?, 1986 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137, 138-39. "The general rule of corporate successor
liability has been-and in fact continues to be-that where one company sells or otherwise
transfers all of its assets to another company, the acquiring company is not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the selling company, including those caused by the torts of the selling
company, simply by the virtue of its succession to the ownership of the assets of the selling
company." ld.; see also Giraldi v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D. Md.
1988); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991); Flangher v. Cone Automatic
Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331,334 (Ohio 1987); 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 231 (rev. perm. ed. 1990); John C. Dupee,
Acquisition of Goodwll: The Acid Test of Successor Liability, 53 ALB. L. Ray. 475 (1989).
8 See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
9 Id.
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compensation. 10 In reaction to this draconian outcome, some courts have
adopted a fifth continuity of enterprise exception to the general rule of non-
liability of successor corporations. The continuity of enterprise exception
extends liability to successor corporations which continue the enterprise of the
predecessor corporation. 11 If the jurisdiction in which our hypothetical plaintiff
P brings his action, adopts the continuity of enterprise exception, then P has a
means by which he may receive compensation for his injuries.
The continuity of enterprise exception has caused great controversy in the
courts that have dealt with it. Mssen Corp. v. Miller, the focus of this Case
Comment, is an excellent example of the uncertainty with which courts
approach the continuity of enterprise exception. Prior to the Nissen case, two
federal district courts, within one week of each other, made opposite forecasts
whether Maryland would adopt expanded successor liability in the form of
continuity of enterprise. One predicted that Maryland would accept continuity
of enterprise, 12 and the other predicted that Maryland would not adopt the
exception. 13 The Nissen case itself wound through the Special Appellate14 and
Appellate divisions of the Maryland court system: the Court of Special Appeals
adopting continuity of enterprise in Maryland, and the court of appeals
reversed the lower court holding that Maryland would not accept extended
successor. liability. 15
The Mssen court is not the only court which has expressed reservations
about continuity of enterprise as a means to expand successor liability. The
10 This scenario assumes that there was no intermediate distributor of the product from
whom the plaintiff might seek compensation on strict liability grounds. But, even if there
were a middle-man distributor, continuity of enterprise would still be relevant insofar as it
might be available to that distributor in attempting to seek indemnification from the
successor corporation.
I1 There are several elements which factor into the determination whether a
corporation continues the enterprise of a predecessor corporation; these will be discussed
extensively infra Parts IV-VI.
12 Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Md. 1988).
13 Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988).
14 The Maryland court system is similar to the New York court system in that
Maryland courts are not called trial, appeal, and supreme in the manner of most states. In
Maryland, the lowest state courts are called district courts, the intermediate appellate court
is the Court of Special Appeals, and the highest court is the Court of Appeals. ROBERT S.
WANT, FEDERAL-STATE CouRT DIRECroRY 132 (1992).
15 Nissen v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564,573 (Md. 1991).
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exception has thus far been adopted in very few jurisdictions, 16 expressly
rejected by several states, 17 and is still a matter of uncertainty in others. 18 Not
surprisingly, those commentators who have discussed the continuity of
enterprise exception appear as torn as the courts that have faced the issue.19
The objective of this Case Comment is to survey a number of cases and
comments leading up to the recent Maryland Court of Appeals decision in
issen Corp. v. Miller.20 In Section I, the facts and procedural history of
Nissen are discussed. Section III contains a brief summary of the history of
successor liability. Next, Section IV discusses and analyzes a number of
rationales which are often advanced to justify extended liability doctrines such
as continuity of enterprise. Section V examines the decisions of the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals in the Ni1ssen
case. Finally, in Section VI, this Case Comment will attempt to assess the
future of the continuity of enterprise exception and the likelihood of its
continuing acceptance, or further rejection.
16 Holoway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977); Monzingo
v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (Miss. 1985); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,
244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
17 See Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law);
Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky
law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law);
Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law);
Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Green v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., Inc., 460 N.E.2d 895 (11. App. Ct. 1984); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417
N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1987); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb.
1982); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984);
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989); Goucher v. Parmac, Inc.,
694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984);
Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 NAV.2d
820 (Wis. 1985).
18 Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977); Salavati
v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Flaugher
v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987).
19 See Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Satutory Reform to
Protect Products Liability aaimants, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 17, 21 (1986); Rogala, supra
note 4; Shecter, supra note 7.
20 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991).
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I. THE FACTS OF NSSEN CoRP. V. MffLER
The actors in Nissen Corp. v. Miller21 are many and varied. There are
doctors, foreign corporations, retail merchants, dissolved successor
corporations, and a cast of thousands. The event that engendered this litigation
occurred on January 31, 1981.22 On this day, Dr. Fredrick B. Brandt
[hereinafter Brandt] purchased from Atlantic Fitness Products [hereinafter
Atlantic] a treadmill that was designed, manufactured and marketed by
American Tredex Corporation [hereinafter Tredex].
Six months later, on July 31, 1981, Nissen entered into an asset purchase
agreement with Tredex. Pursuant to this agreement, Nissen purchased the
name, patent, inventory, and other assets from Tredex. Nissen also assumed
some of Tredex's liabilities and obligations, but the contract expressly excluded
assumption of liabilities arising from any product previously sold by Tredex.23
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, 24 the selling corporation, Tredex,
continued in existence for five years renamed as the AT Corporation. Nissen
continued to sell replacement parts for equipment sold by Tredex before the
sale of the assets.
On October 18, 1986, over five years after his purchase of the treadmill
and the sale of Tredex's assets to Nissen, Brandt was seriously injured while
trying to adjust the running treadmill. Approximately one year later on
December 31, 1987, Tredex was administratively dissolved.25
Brandt and his wife filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
September 1, 1988, against Tredex, AT Corporation, Nissen and Atlantic
alleging negligence and strict liability. 26 Atlantic and Nissen answered the
21 Id.
2 2 The following facts are excerpted from Miller v. Nissen, 575 A.2d 758, 758-59
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); and Nissen v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564,564-66 (Md. 1991).
23 This is a fact of singular importance in the litigation. See Miller, 575 A.2d at 759
n.1.
24 Also pursuant to the terms of the contract, Nissen was required to pay Tredex a
$600,000 advance on the contract's execution. In addition to the purchase price, Nissen
agreed to pay, for five years, a fee of 4% of their net sales and Tredex was required to keep
all accounts receivable. Nsen, 594 A.2d at 565.
25 1d.
26 Breach of express and implied warranties of fitness were also alleged, but need not
be dealt with here. This Case Comment deals specifically with the issue of strict liability in
products liability, as the Msren court said, "[If we reject the imposition of liability based on
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complaint denying liability and asserting affirmative defenses. In May 1989,
Nissen filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was not
responsible for any injuries involving equipment sold or manufactured by
American Tredex prior to the date of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 27
The Maryland trial court granted summary judgment for the Nissen
Corporation based on the traditional rule of non-liability of successor
corporations. 28 The case was then appealed by Miller to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals.29 The Court of Special Appeals held that Maryland would
recognize the continuity of enterprise exception.30 Finally, the court of appeals
granted Nissen's petition of certiorari and reversed the holding of the court of
special appeals, rejecting the continuity of enterprise doctrine.3 1
Ill. THE RULE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILTrY
As stated above, the general rule of corporate successor liability, when one
company sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another company, is
non-liability for the successor corporation. There are, however, four historic
exceptions to the traditional rule of non-liability of successor corporations: (1)
when there is an express or implied agreement to assume the liabilities; (2) if
the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) if the successor entity
is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor entity; or (4) if the
transaction was fraudulent, not made in good faith, or made without sufficient
consideration. 32
To more fully explain why these exceptions were not available to the
plaintiff in the Mssen case, it is useful to discuss each in turn. The first
exception can only be invoked when a successor corporation makes an express
or implied agreement to assume the predecessor corporation's liabilities. The
continuity of enterprise in the strict liability count, it follows that we reject it in the
negligence and breach of warranty counts." Nirsen, 594 A.2d at 567.2 7 Miler, 575 A.2d at 760 n.1.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3 0 Id. at 762. For a discussion of the court of special appeals decision, see infra notes
90-100 and accompanying text.
31 Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, .573 (Md. 1991). For a discussion of the
court of appeals decision see infra notes 101-25 and accompanying text.
32 Rogala, supra note 4; see also Cyr v. B. Often & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1151 (1st
Cir. 1974); Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1446, 1448 (D. Md. 1988);
Miller v. Nissen Corp., 575 A.2d 758, 760 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877 n.3 (Mich. 1976); Flaugher v. Cone
Automatic Mach., 507 N.E.2d 331,334 (Ohio 1987).
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application of this exception is fairly straight forward; if a successor
corporation agrees, either expressly or impliedly, 33 to assume the liabilities of
the predecessor corporation, then it will be held culpable for any liability that
arises after the dissolution of the predecessor corporation. In the Nisen case,
there was, in fact, an express agreement that the Nissen corporation would not
assume the liabilities of American Tredex. 34
The second exception is applicable in situations in which there is a
transaction which amounts to a consolidation or merger. This is also known as
a "de facto" merger.35 Two of the factors which must be present in order to
constitute a de facto merger are a continuity of the corporations' shareholders
and a prompt dissolution of the selling corporation.36 The Mssen case
33 An implied assumption of liability means that "[a]bsent agreement by the successor
corporation, its conduct must manifest an intent to assume the tort liability of its
predecessor, or the equities must be sufficiently strong to impose that liability on the
successor corporation." Smdth, 737 F. Supp. at 1449.
34 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
35 The following factors are often used by courts in order to determine whether an
asset acquisition amounts to a de facto merger rather than an ordinary purchase and sale of
assets:
(1) Whether there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(2) Whether the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(3) Whether the purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the seller
ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of
the seller corporation.
(4) Whether there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they
become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1985).
In performing an analysis under these elements, the courts consider substance over
form and look to the nature of the transaction as a whole, as reflected in the sale agreement
and its actual consequences. Philadelphia Elec., 762 F.2d at 310; Travis v. Harris Corp.,
565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 366
(3d Cir. 1974).36 Shecter, supra note 7, at 139
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concerned a cash-for-assets transaction37 which negates the possibility of any
continuity of shareholders. Also, American Tredex was required to continue in
existence for five years as the AT Corporation; thus there was no prompt
dissolution.
The third exception requires that the successor corporation be a mere
continuation of the predecessor corporation. This exception is the progenitor of
the continuity of enterprise exception, but it is applied very strictly. The
successor corporation must be virtually identical to the prior corporation before
this exception can be utilized.38 Unfortunately for Brandt, the Nissen
corporation was not virtually identical to American Tredex: all of the
Corporation's facilities were relocated from Indiana to Iowa, the name was
changed and Nissen was not required to retain any of American Tredex's
employees. 39
The fourth exception applies only if the conveyance was made fraudulently
or in bad faith. A corporation might use these tactics to avoid liability for
debts. 4° In the present case, however, there was no suggestion of any collusion
or wrongdoing.
As courts applied this rule and its exceptions, situations arose in which
injured plaintiffs were forced to remain remediless because they were unable to
squeeze into the narrow definitions of the four traditional exceptions. To
abrogate the harshness of such results, the courts have developed further
exceptions, 41 such as continuity of enterprise, in order to reach more equitable
results.
37 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
38 "The mere continuation or continuity of entity exception applies where 'there is a
continuation of directors and management, shareholder interest and... continuation of the
corporate entity... .'" Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d at 567 (quoting Louis R.
FRUMRm & MELVIN I. FRmDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2.06[2][c], at 2-182-83); see also
Green, supra note 19, at 21.
3 9 Assen, 594 A.2d at 565. The iMssen court dismisses this exception with the
statement that not even the respondents contended "that Nissen is a 'mere continuation' of
American Tredex... ." Id at 567.
40 Green, supra note 19, at 23.
41 Another doctrine of expanded successor liability is the product-line theory. The
product-line theory primarily evolved out of two cases: Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3
(Cal. 1977) and Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811 (NJ. 1981).
In Ray, the plaintiff sustained injuries from a defective ladder manufactured by Alad
Corporation [hereinafter "Alad I"]. Prior to the plaintiff's accident, Alad I had sold its assets
for cash consideration and thereafter dissolved. The successor corporation bought and
retained the name "Alad Corporation." A/ad, 560 P.2d at 3-5.
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IV. RATIONALES OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF EXTENDING LIABILrY TO
ENcoMPASS CONTINUrrY OF ENTERPRISE
Before analyzing the decisions of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
and Court of Appeals, it greatly facilitates the goal of this Case Comment (the
determination of whether the continuity of enterprise doctrine should be further
adopted or rejected) to examine several of the rationales that are proffered in
order to bolster the imposition of liability on successor corporations. These
rationales will then be utilized as a framework for the analysis and discussion
of the Maryland courts' decisions.
Through the evolution of expanded successor liability doctrines, such as
continuity of enterprise, six rationales have developed which support the
imposition of expanded liability on a successor corporation. 42 These rationales
are: (1) even though a change of ownership has taken place, the fact that no
change is obvious to the consumer should cause the courts to treat the successor
as if it were the predecessor; 43 (2) if a successor corporation obtains goodwill
The court held Alad I liable and ruled that "a party which acquires a manufacturing
business and continues the output of its line of products... assumes strict tort liability for
defects in units of the same product line previously manufactured and distributed by the
entity from which the business was acquired." Alad, 560 P.2d at 11.
The court's justification for imposing liability on the successor was threefold:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business,
(2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading rule
[sic], and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's goodwill
being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.
With regard to numbers one and three above, the court reasoned the successor caused the
plaintiff to be remediless by virtue of the successor acquiring the resources that the original
manufacturer would have used to compensate the plaintiff. The successor should bear the
burden of the manufacturing business because it is receiving the benefits from it. Alad, 560
P.2d at 3.
4 2 Green, supra note 19, at 17.
43 Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976); see also
Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977) (if a successor
operates under a virtually identical name then they are estopped from denying liability);
Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785-86 (Ala. 1979).
19931
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
and benefits from its predecessor, it is only equitable that it should also assume
the burdens that flow with the benefits; 44 (3) the successor is in the best
position to provide compensation 45 and spread the risk;46 (4) by purchasing the
predecessor's assets with cash, the successor contributes to the destruction of
the plaintiff's remedies;47 (5) a deterrence rationale which holds that losses can
best be minimized by imposing liability on the successor, thereby encouraging
post-sale safety measures; 48 and (6) the successor has the ability to act as a
"conduit" to channel losses back to the predecessor by prospectively
discounting the purchase price in accordance with the predecessor's projected
liability for defective products.49
A. Holing Out
The first rationale relies on actions by the successor corporation by which
it essentially holds itself out as the predecessor. An example would be a
corporation which buys the assets of another corporation yet continues to run
the business of the predecessor corporation under the predecessor's name and
with no notice to the public that the ownership has changed.50 Some
commentators have suggested that while there is superficial appeal to this
analogy, there are substantial flaws in the reasoning. 51 The flaw primarily
asserted is that the reliance of third parties must be based on representations by
the principal. 52
However, this argument ignores the fact that the raison d'etre of an
extended liability doctrine is to hold a successor corporation liable for the acts
of its predecessor. Any representation made by the successor corporation for all
44 See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
45 See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977).
46 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 820-22 (NJ. 1981).
47 David Morris Phillips, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate
and Ciercial Law Perspective, 11 HomRA L. RLv. 249 (1982).
48 Green, supra note 19, at 21.
49 I.
50 See Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979) (stating
that it is unfair if a corporation "holds itself out as if it were the old family firm with which
they originally dealt. It is only when an injury occurs that they inform their customers that
they are not really the... [predecessor corporation] who manufactured the [product]);
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976).
51 Green, supra note 19, at 28; Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Contdnuity and
Sucemor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906, 912 (1983).
52 See supra note 51.
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intents and purposes is retroactive. That is, any claim the successor corporation
makes about a product it produces will necessarily apply to products the
predecessor corporation manufactured. The average consumer, not knowing
that ownership of the corporation has changed, will rely upon any further
representations by the corporation. When dealing with representations made by
the predecessor corporation, it is not unfair to say that the successor
corporation now guarantees these same representations by holding itself out as
the predecessor corporation. When applying liberal liability doctrines like
continuity of enterprise, it places form over substance to adhere to strict
definitions of reliance. As the court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co. 53
stated, "solvent corporations... should not be permitted to discharge their
liabilities to injured persons simply by shuffling paper and manipulating
corporate entities." 54
B. Burdens Should Flow with the Benefits
The second rationale utilized by courts finding extended liability is
essentially a "burdens should flow with benefits" rationale. 55 At least two
scholars assert that this is a viable means by which to determine whether a
successor corporation should be held liable for the torts of its predecessor. 56
53 Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
54Id. at 802.
55 See Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801 (The court stated: "public policy requires
that... [the predecessor corporation] having received the benefits of a going concern,
should also assume the costs which all other going concerns must ordinarily bear.");
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 340 (Ohio 1987) (Sweeney, I.,
dissenting).
56 Jerry Phillips asserts:
One approach might be to determine whether the purchaser has paid for intangible
items having what might be described as ongoing business value. If it buys this value, it
buys product line continuity; if it does not, then it buys only assets. Business value
might include intangibles such as trade names, trademarks, trade secrets, logo,
customer lists, and goodwill. If the buyer purchases one or any combination of these
intangibles for a significant consideration, then it seems fair to conclude that the
corporation as an ongoing business has been purchased.
This approach has two apparent advantages. First, liability could not easily be
circumvented under this test If the purchaser, in collusion with the seller, attempted to
hide the purchase of ongoing business value by overpricing tangible assets, such a
1993]
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Other commentators contend that this rationale is specious and weak.57 Those
that take the latter position argue that the benefits a successor corporation
receives are largely in the form of goodwill. "Unless the courts relying on this
argument are creating a new concept of property rights .. ." ,58 making the
imposition of liability based solely on the acquisition of goodwill seems
patently inequitable.5 9 While both arguments against liability predicated on the
acquisition of intangibles such as goodwill are cogent, the former is the one
that is most in line with the equitable goals of an extended liability doctrine.
The caveats given by the opponents of this rationale are worth heeding to the
extent that it is probably unwise to base extended liability solely on the
purchase of intangibles; there should be some other rationale or policy satisfied
at the same time.
C. Compensation and Loss/Risk Spreading
The third rationale is actually composed of two different policies:
compensation and loss/risk spreading. These same rationales are generally
espoused as the underlying policies used to impose strict liability on product
manufacturers. 60 The extension of these rationales into the realm of expanded
successor liability is more strained than in regular products liability cases.
Traditional notions of culpability must be set aside in order to hold a
practice would normally be detectable and be set aside as fraudulent. Second, this
approach would give the buyer the option of not purchasing ongoing business value if it
does not want to.
Phillips, supra note 51, at 921. David Phillips asserts:
[lit may be argued that the value which the successor paid the predecessor for goodwill
reflected not only the probability of favorable sales from use of the trade name, but also
the probability of loss of sales because the successor's products would be associated
with products previously manufactured by the predecessor that would prove to be
defective. If the probable benefit exceeded the risk of loss of goodwill from the
predecessor's defective products, the goodwill still had a positive value to the successor.
Phillips, supra note 47, at 255.
5 7 Green, supra note 19.
58 Id.
59 See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978);
Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Wisc. 1982).
60 James A. Henderson, Coping With The Tne Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REv. 919, 931-39 (1981).
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corporation, which may bear absolutely no relation to a particular product,
liable for injuries caused by that product.
1. Compensation
Compensation is perhaps the strongest motivating force in our legal
system. The American courts are anchored in a solid foundation of
commitment to the injured party.61 The need for compensation is obviously
present in a situation in which, through no fault of his or her own, a plaintiff is
left remediless because a corporation has sold its assets in a cash rather than
stock transaction. Yet, some commentators suggest that imposing liability on a
successor corporation is as capricious as arbitrarily choosing a random
corporation, bearing no relation at all to the product, and imposing liability
upon it.62 However, the validity of this argument is questionable. A successor
corporation always has the option of negotiating the risk of future litigation into
the price paid for the assets. Imposing liability on a corporation that has fully
negotiated a transaction, with all the liabilities and risks therein concerned, is
hardly the same as imposing liability on some unlucky corporation chosen at
random out of a phonebook.
Also inherent in the compensation rationale is a basic notion of fairness.
When a consumer pays value for a product, she has a right to expect that it will
not fail dangerously in its intended use.63 Moreover, manufacturers and
distributors oftentimes try to market their product as though it were infallible.
Intuitively, it seems fair to allow a plaintiff in such a case to claim
compensation based on the unfair disappointment of reasonable expectations.
With all this in mind, there is no reason that compensation will not serve as
an effective rationale upon which to expand successor liability. An exception to
the traditional rule of non-liability of successor corporations, such as continuity
of enterprise, is well supported by the rationale of compensation. 64
61 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62 Green, supra note 19.
63 Henderson, supra note 60.
64 C Rogala, supra note 4, at 43.
The expansion of liability is an overzealous attempt to compensate. It cripples the
minimization of accident costs and risk spreading-two policies underlying strict
product liability-and it fails to place the liability of compensation on one who has
reaped the fiuits from the defective product's sale... the sole strict liability goal that is
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2. Loss Spreading
Effective loss spreading can be achieved through the expansion of
successor liability. As between the two, the successor corporation is in a much
better position than the consumer to spread the risk of loss. The corporation
can analyze the predecessor corporation's records and calculate the probability
of a particular product causing injury to a consumer, and increase or decrease
the price of the product accordingly. Albeit this is not an exact science, but it is
obvious that a corporation is in a better position to make these determinations
than the consumer.
The theory of loss allocation or burden spreading, holds that the greater the
number of people who share in the loss, the more that burden is alleviated in
respect to any particular individual.65 It is unjust if a single entity is forced to
bear the entire burden for an injury. A manufacturer, by obtaining products
liability insurance, is in a superior position to bear the cost.66
Another means a manufacturer has of passing on the costs is raising the
price of the good to reflect an estimate of the burden that will be incurred by
defective products. 67 For there to be efficient loss allocation, the price of the
good must accurately reflect its cost to society. 68 If the good is particularly
costly to society and its price does not reflect this, then the level of injury-
causing activity will not decrease. Nor is it beneficial if a product that is
particularly useful is given an injury cost that is too high, because the beneficial
activity will fall below the desired level.
D. Destruction of Plaintiff's Remedies
The fourth rationale holds that by choosing to purchase a corporation's
assets for cash, the successor corporation has contributed to the destruction of
the plaintiff's remedies and should therefore be held culpable for the plaintiff's
injuries. Predictably, there are differing viewpoints as to the validity of this
rationale. One side asserts that imposing liability on a corporation that engages
realized by expanding successor liability is compensation. Thus, the courts' action to
expand successor product liability takes on a social insurance function ....
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
6 7 Henderson, supra note 60, at 932.
6 8 Rogala, supra note 4, at 42.
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in an asset acquisition is implying that it has committed some wrong that
requires punishment, especially when "one recognizes that a successor is
merely engaged in that most cherished of free market ideals-purchasing assets
that it believes it can put to more productive uses." 69 The other side of the coin
holds that a successor corporation, when deciding to purchase the assets of
another corporation, can make an analysis to determine how great the
"recourse risk" (the probability of leaving a plaintiff without recourse or
remedy) is likely to be and adjust its purchase price accordingly. 70 Perhaps an
even more cherished "free market ideal" than the ability to purchase assets is
the right to enter into a fully negotiated bargain. It is hardly offensive to any
traditional notions of equity or justice to impose liability upon a party if he or
she has freely contracted with that liability in mind.
E. Deterrence
The fifth rationale, deterrence, is one of the most traditional bases for
imposing liability in any products liability situation.71 The goal of general
deterrence in products liability law is to cause certain activities to become more
expensive and, therefore, less attractive to manufacturers. 72 If manufacturers
know that they will be held liable for the costs that their defective products
cause, the deterrence theory encourages them to produce safer products to
avoid the cost of these injuries. 73
In the context of products liability suits brought against successor
corporations, the deterrence rationale is applied to the successor corporation so
69 Green, supra note 19.
70 phiflips, supra note 47, at 257.
[t]he successor corporation... can construct a posterior probability with respect to the
recourse risk, which is both far higher and more accurate than the anterior probability
that the consumer would be able to construct when purchasing the product. When
negotiating with the predecessor corporation to purchase the assets, the successor can
protect itself without an undue expediture of transaction costs. The successor, in short,
can protect against the recourse risk at a lower cost than can the consumer or product
user.
Id.
71 Green, supra note 19.
72 See generally STUART M. MADDEN, PRODUCTSLABIL1TY §§ 6.1, 6.2 (2d ed. 1988).
73 Id.
19931
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that it will have a stronger incentive to increase post-sale safety measures. 74
The camps are perhaps more deeply divided over the deterrence rationale than
any other in the battle to rationally justify expanded successor liability.75 Some
argue that the deterrence rationale is simply "inapplicable to every
case.... "76 If the ultimate goal of expanded liability is to compensate the
injured party and encourage manufacturers to produce a safer product, then
using a deterrence rationale is an inefficient means to reach these goals as
"nothing the new owner does now can shield it from liability for products his
predecessor has already distributed." 77
It is argued that the imposition of liability on successor corporations
through doctrines such as continuity of enterprise is justified on the grounds
that liability acts in a deterrent fashion insofar as corporations will be far more
careful in putting untested products on the market. 78 The most comprehensive
arguments presented against the deterrence rationale in expanded liability
doctrines are offered by Professor Michael D. Green. 79 Green suggests that if
the deterrence rationale is to be properly relied upon to extend traditional
liability, it should serve to deter the manufacturer by: (1) encouraging pre-
distribution safety measures; and (2) passing the costs of product-related
injuries on to the consumer.80
There are several problems with the application of these rationales to an
expanded liability situation such as continuity of enterprise. First, the
encouragement of pre-distribution safety measures poses problems insofar as
imposing liability on a corporation that was incapable of contributing to a
product's design or manufacture cannot, by definition, further this deterrence
function.81 A successor corporation has no opportunity to minimize liability
74 See Green, supra note 19; George L. Lenard, Products Liability of Succesor
Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. LJ. 677 (1983).
75 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
7 6 Sharon L. Cloud, Purchase of Assets And Successor Liability: A Necesarily
Arbitrary Linit, 11DEL. J. CoRP. L. 791, 810 (1986).
7 7 ld.
7 8 See Timothy j. Murphy, A Policy Analysis of A Successor Corporation's Liability
For Its Predecessor's Defective Products When The Successor Has Acquired The
Predecessor's Assets For Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 815, 838 (1988) ("The deterrence
rationale is a sufficient justification for imposing liability in our tort system even though it is
shown that this rationale does not support all of the successor liability theories.").
79 Green, supra note 19.8 0 Id.
81 Id.
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risks; it is simply saddled with whatever degree of safety precautions the
predecessor chose to take.
Next, the market deterrence rationale suggests that accidents will be
reduced by making products reflect the costs of injuries associated with their
use.82 This rationale suffers from several inadequacies. The theory does not
justify imposing liability on a corporation that takes steps to eliminate the
dangerous aspects of a product, or a successor who discontinues a product line
altogether and is therefore unable to pass the costs on to the consumer through
the market.83 Furthermore, if the market rationale is taken a step further, a
successor corporation which has purchased only a particular line of products
from a corporate entity that continues after the sale will be held liable even
though the predecessor corporation is still in existence. This is because only the
successor corporation is in the position to pass the costs of that particular line
of products on to the market.84
F. Conduit Theory
The sixth and final rationale for the imposition of liability on a successor
corporation is the "conduit theory." 85 The conduit theory holds that liability is
imposed upon the successor not merely because they are the successor, but
because they act as a conduit by discounting the purchase price of the
acquisition by the amount of the predicted future products' liability of the
predecessor.86 The conduit rationale is unique among the rationales presented
to justify expanded successor liability; it is the only one that expressly
recognizes that the predecessor is liable for the defects in its products. 87 It is
asserted that once liberal successor liability laws are adopted and promulgated,
successors will take it upon themselves to create some mechanism by which
82 See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 822 (NJ. 1981).
83 Green, supra note 19, at 27-30.
84 Id.
85 See Lynda G. Wilson, Corporate Succesor Liability For Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 40 S.C. L. REv. 509 (1989) ("In this test the purchase price is
discounted by the amount of damages the successor reasonably could have foreseen, thus
punishing the predecessor by reducing the amount it otherwise would have received from its
assets." ME at 539.); Jeffrey Allen Mullins, Case Comment, Product Liability Law: Ohio
Adopts The Traditional Rule of Corporate Successor Liability--Flaugher v. Cone Automatic
Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987), 13 U. DAY'rON L. REy. 329 (1988).
86 Lenard, supra note 71.
87 Green, supra note 19, at 30-33.
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they are able to avoid the predecessor's future liability and still make sure that
injured plaintiffs receive compensation. 88 "Potential successors will either
discount the purchase price to reflect the future liability, demand that the
predecessor acquire insurance or provide some other mechanism to ensure that
the predecessor bears the costs of future claims, or, if no acceptable mechanism
can be fashioned, withdraw from the proposed acquisition." 89
These six rationales are the most commonly used by a court that wishes to
expand successor liability to encompass a non-traditional exception such as
continuity of enterprise. Keeping in mind these rationales, the next section
analyzes the decisions of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and Court of
Appeals.
V. THE HOLDINGS AND RATIONALES OF THE MARYLAND COURTS
A. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals
The continuity of enterprise exception to the traditional rule of non-liability
of successor corporations is essentially judicial caulking which attempts to seal
the cracks between the four traditional exceptions to the rule of non-liability
and compensate hapless plaintiffs like Brandt. Very few courts have as yet
adopted the exception, 90 yet the Maryland Court of Special Appeals opined that
it was time for Maryland to join the ranks of states embracing the continuity of
enterprise exception. 91
The court of special appeals in Nissen did not spend much time reviewing
the evolution of continuity of enterprise; instead, it relied largely upon Smith v.
Navistar International Transport Corp.,92 a case decided by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. 93 In Navistar, approving of
continuity of enterprise, Judge Niemeyer asserted "the underlying policy for
imposing product liability on a successor corporation... under this doctrine of
continuity of enterprise is the demonstration that the successor corporation has
taken the place of the predecessor corporation and therefore is assumed to take
881ad
89 Id.
9 0 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
9 1 Miller v. Nissen Corp., 575 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
92 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988).
93 The Navistar case did not itself accept continuity of enterprise. Judge Neimeyer held
that on the facts of the case, the continuity of enterprise doctrine was inapplicable, but not
that Maryland would reject the doctrine altogether. ld. at 1450-51.
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on liability." 94 Referring back to the rationales discussed in the previous
section, it is obvious that the rationale of the Navistar decision was based
largely upon the "holding-out" rationale.95 Based on Judge Niemeyer's
decision that the Maryland Court of Appeals, when faced squarely with the
issue, would accept continuity of enterprise, the court of special appeals held,
"we adopt an expanded interpretation of the third exception, which Judge
Niemeyer terms the 'substantial continuation' 96 exception." 97
The court of special appeals, in its decision, does not make any effort to
analyze the continuity of enterprise doctrine. The court relies almost entirely on
the reasoning and rationale of Judge Niemeyer in the Navistar case. The fact
that the court of special appeals relies so heavily upon the Navistar decision is
troublesome, especially since another case, Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,98
written just one month later by another judge from the United States District
Court of Maryland, reached an opposite conclusion. In the Giraldi case, Judge
Smallkin, writing that Maryland courts would not accept the continuity of
enterprise doctrine, asserted "this court forecasts that the Court of Appeals of
Maryland would accept the 'pure' version of the traditional rule . . . [of]
limited successor liability." 99
Given the fact that two Maryland district courts arrived at opposite
conclusions within one month of each other and that the Mssen case was the
first time the Maryland courts were forced to deal squarely with the continuity
of enterprise exception, the court of special appeals should have engaged in a
much more thorough analysis than it did. As a result of the court of special
appeals' cursory analysis, its opinion adopts the continuity of enterprise
doctrine without considering the ramifications or effects from such a ruling. In
particular, the decision completely ignores the several rationales that are
advanced in support or opposition to the expansion of successor liability.100
9 4 Miler, 575 A.2d at 761 (quoting Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 687 F.
Supp. 201,206 (D. Md. 1988)).
95 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
96 Judge Niemeyer's factors for "substantial continuation" are virtually identical to the
test espoused for continuity of enterprise. Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at 1450.
97 Miller, 575 A.2d at 762.
98 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988)
9 9 Id. at 991.10 0 See generally Miller v. Nissen, 575 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
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B. The Maryland Court ofAppeals
The court of appeals makes a much more thorough analysis of the history
and consequences of adopting the continuity of enterprise doctrine. While the
court of appeals' decision may not necessarily be the one that is most beneficial
to society, it makes a reasoned analysis of the goals and rationales which
underlie the continuity of enterprise exception before rejecting it.
In deciding to reject the continuity of enterprise exception, the ANssen court
considered several earlier cases from various jurisdictions that dealt with the
exception. The Nlissen court began its discussion with the case that is generally
considered to contain the genesis of the continuity of enterprise exception. This
case is the landmark successor products liability case, Turner v. Bituninous
Casualty Co. 101 In Turner, the plaintiff was injured at work while handling a
power press. 102 As a result of the accident, both of the plaintiff's hands were
amputated. 10 3 The manufacturer of the press, T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company
[hereinafter Sheridan], sold all of its assets in a cash-for-assets transaction to
Harris Intertype Corporation. Four years prior to Seaman Manufaauring Co.,
Turner's employer purchased the press. 1°4 Sheridan ceased to exist as a
separate entity shortly thereafter.105
It is interesting to note that the fact patterns in the Turner and NtIssen cases
are virtually identical. Both cases concern plaintiffs injured by a product
manufactured by a corporation subsequently purchased in a cash-for-assets
transaction. The circuit judge in Turner, as 'did the judge in Nssen,
acknowledged that "Harris [successor corporation] had.., no relationship to
the equipment sold and manufactured by . . . Sheridan [predecessor
corporation]." 106
The Michigan Supreme Court, disturbed by the inequity of Turner's plight,
granted certiorari107 after the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to hear
the case. The Turner court began by dispensing with the distinction between
cash-for-asset transactions and de facto mergers. 10 8 "To the injured person...
101 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
102 These facts are taken directly from the Turner case. Id. at 875.
103 Id.
104 Id.
10 5 Id
.
106 Id.
107 Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
108 This was an extremely important step in holding the successor corporation liable.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54:261
CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE
no matter what corporate process led to the transfer of the first corporation...
so long as the first corporation in each case... became defunct. [The plaintift]
has no place to turn for relief except to the second corporation." 1°9
The Turner court also suggested that the abolition of this traditional bar to
liability was not repugnant to the usual business practices of corporations. "[I]f
there are no real business reasons for choosing a cash acquisition of corporate
assets and the only real reason is to avoid products liability suits, then it would
seem that the machinery of corporate law is unreasonably geared up to
accomplish a purpose not really intended for it or in the public interest." 110
Having dispensed with the most serious traditional bar to imposition of
liability, the Michigan Supreme Court then formulated "guidelines to establish
whether there is continuity between the transferee and transferor
corporations." 1" These guidelines are: (1) there is a basic continuity of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, including the retention of such things as the
name, employees, assets and general business operations; (2) the seller
corporation dissolves soon after the distribution of the consideration received
from the sale; (3) the purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities of the
successor corporation necessary to continue the normal business operations of
the predecessor corporation; and (4) the successor corporation held itself out as
the effective continuation of the predecessor corporation. 112
Despite the great similarity of the factual situations between the two cases,
the Nrissen court brushed aside the Turner court's opinion with a minimum of
consideration. The Nissen court asserted that the Turner court's rationale was
"nebulous" and that it did "not agree that traditional rules of successor liability
should be 'shaken off' as 'impediments.'" 1 13 By rejecting the Turner case, the
Nissen court, by implication, also rejected the holding-out rationale.
The next case the Nissen court considered was Andrews v. John E. Smith's
Sons Co., 114 in which the Alabama Supreme Court chose to adopt the
10 9 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
110 Id. at 880.
111 d. at 883.
112 Id. at 883-84.
113 lUsen, 594 A.2d at 572. Other courts are similarly unimpressed with the reasoning
of the Michigan Supreme Court in Tuner and reject the continuity of enterprise exception.
In Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982), the Supreme Court of Florida
expressly rejected the doctrine stating "we choose not to join this vanguard of courts
[accepting continuity of enterprise] due in part to the threat of economic annihilation that
small business would face under such a rule of expanded liability." Id. at 1049.
114 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979).
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continuity of enterprise exception. In the Andrews case, the plaintiff was
stuffing ground beef into a commercial meat grinder with his hand when it was
caught and pulled into the grinding mechanism. 115 The Alabama Supreme
Court stated, "The reasoning of Turner is persuasive... [tihere was a basic
continuity of the enterprise between the original Smith Co. and Hobam: [the
predecessor and successor corporations] the same products were manufactured
by the same people in the same place."116
The Andrews case suggests a rationale that is most closely analogous to the
benefits and burden rationale discussed above. 117 The Nissen court does not
state what it finds objectionable or incorrect about the decision in Andrews, but
its rejection of the Andrews case can be considered a sub silentlo rejection of
the goodwill rationale. Similarly, the Nissen court elides the issue of why it
rejects the rationale presented in Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co.118 In
its brief discussion of the case, the Nissen court simply states that the opinion
was "unconvincing." 1 19 An analysis of the Holloway court's decision yields the
finding that the court essentially relied on a "holding-out" rationale 120 similar
to that rejected by the Nissen court in its opinion of the Turner case.
The Nissen court then looked at Monzingo v. Correct Manufacturing
Corp., a Mississippi case which is purported to adopt the continuity of
enterprise exception. 121 The Nissen court asserted that since a traditional
continuity of entity could be found "there was no need to expand the traditional
mere continuation exception to encompass the continuity of enterprise theory in
that case ....-" 122 The Nissen court, therefore, is not basing its rejection of
this case on any particular rationale.
In its discussion-of the Bonee v. L & M Construction Chemicals123 case, 124
the Nissen court recognizes that the Bonee case applied an interpretation of
Ohio law that "recognizes the strict liability policy of spreading the risk of loss
to all consumers of a product so that the product will bear the social and
115 Id. at 782.
116 Id. at 785.
117 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
118 Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977).
119 !Men, 594 A.2d at 572.
120 Holloway, 432 F. Supp. at 455.
121 This is apparently a matter of some contention. The NImren court asserts that in
Monzigo, "the court's reasoning illustrates that the successor corporation in that case was a
continuity of entity, in the traditional sense... ." Id. at 572.
122 Aysen, 594 A.2d at 571-72.
123 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (applying Ohio law).
124 Issen, 594 A.2d at 572.
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individual costs of its own defects." 12 The rationale in Bonee sounds similar
to the market deterrence rationale. Since the Nissen court rejects the Bonee
case, it can be inferred that it therefore rejects this rationale as a basis to extend
successor liability.
In its decision, the Nissen court does not explicitly reject any rationale for
the imposition of liability under the continuity of enterprise exception. By its
rejection of the Turner, Andrews, Holloway, Monzingo, and Bonee cases, it
rejects the holding-out, goodwill/benefits and burdens, and market deterrence
rationales.
Three additional rationales remain that the Nissen court did not consider:
compensation, destruction of plaintiff's remedies and the conduit theory. The
next section of this Case Comment will apply these three rationales to the facts
of the Nissen case in order to determine if they provide any additional insight
into the Nissen court's decision.
VI. COMPENSATION, DESTRUCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S REMEDIES AND THE
CONDuIT THEORY RATIONALES APPLIED TO THE NISSEN CASE
A. Compensation
As discussed earlier, the desire to compensate an injured party has long
been one of the primary goals of our legal system. 126 The goal of compensating
an injured party, particularly a blameless one, should not be subrogated to
other needs unless these concerns sufficiently further a societal good that
outweighs the needs of the individual.
The Nissen court never fully addressed the issue of compensation in its
analysis. It is possible that it considered rejection of the cases used in its
analysis, all of which relied at least partially on a compensation rationale, as an
implicit rejection of the compensation justification. Even so, this rationale
needs a more thorough analysis before such a summary dismissal.
As between the two parties, Brandt and Nissen, Nissen is clearly in a
superior position to allocate risk, be it through the price paid for assets, or
some other means. As a result, the Nissen Corporation at least had the
opportunity to effectively bargain for its position. Brandt never had this
opportunity. Brandt's position is due to the negligence of a manufacturer.
125 Id. at 572 (quoting Bonee, 518 F. Supp. at 380).
126 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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While Nissen is not legally considered to be the same manufacturer as Tredex,
because it used cash instead of stock to purchase Tredex's assets, equity and
fairness demand that a successor corporation, which is the effective
continuation of a predecessor enterprise and which possesses the ability to
compensate an individual to whom they should be culpable, should be made to
do so.
The economic argument for compensation is one that has given a great deal
of ammunition to those that oppose the acceptance of the continuity of
enterprise doctrine. 127 The main contention of those that oppose the continuity
of enterprise doctrine on economic grounds was succinctly stated by the court
in Polius v. Clark Equipment Co.. 128 The Polius court asserted that because "a
corporation the size of General Motors may be able to spread the cost...
among its millions of customers does not mean that a machine shop employing
five or ten individuals has similar capabilities." 129 The Nissen court echoed a
similar fear when it stated, "[W]ere we to adopt continuity of enterprise, not
only would liability be imposed upon 'a major corporation,' but it would also
be imposed upon the small business operation which may not be in a position
to spread the risk or insure against it."130
The concern about the economic ramifications of utilizing compensation as
a basis for the imposition of liability under an expanded liability doctrine such
as continuity of enterprise is a'valid one. At least one scholar has asserted that
wide acceptance of the continuity of enterprise doctrine would sound the death
knell for small businesses. 131 Yet, both scholars and courts overlook the fact
that it might be possible to compensate an injured individual using the
continuity of enterprise doctrine without driving any great number of small
businesses into bankruptcy. A system of garnishment 132 could be created by
127 See Rogala, supra note 4, at 54.
128 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986).
129 Id. at 81.
130 Assen, 594 A.2d at 570.
131 See Rogala, supra note 4, at 42.
132 The concept of garnishment is one that has been around for several centuries. See
generally JOHN R. ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ATTACHMENTS, GARNISHMENTS,
JuDGmENTS, AND ExEcurIoNs (1901) (discussing the history of garnishment and various
leading cases). Garnishment can arise "out of a tort action (personal injury, property
damage, etc.) or any type of claim. Basically, any claim which is due from one person to
another can be satisfied in whole or in part by the use of garnishment. ..." STANLEY
MORGANSTERN, LEGAL PROTEION IN GARNISHMENT AND ATrACHMENT 1 (1971).
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which even a small business, assuming that a determination of liability was
made, could provide compensation for the injured party, without forcing it to
liquidate. A system of award caps could also be established, limiting the
amount of damages possible, taking into account net worth, profit, debts, and
other relevant factors.
This scheme would undoubtedly face challenges on several fronts. There is
a basic equity question: is it fair to penalize one company more or less simply
because it is larger? Viewed from a societal standpoint, choosing between
penalizing a small business up to a point without forcing it into bankruptcy
while at the same time compensating an injured person, or simply leaving a
plaintiff utterly without remedy, would seem to be clear.
The groundwork for such a scheme would best be laid by the legislature,
since reform of this sort is not generally initiated by the courts. Given the need
for tort reform in our system, 133 it would not be inconsistent to award
payments in product liability suits on what is essentially an "ability-to-pay"
basis. There are few plaintiffs who would not accept a reduced award,
assuming liability could be shown under continuity of enterprise, in lieu of
being left remediless. The compensation rationale, therefore, is quite possibly a
very compelling rationale for the continuity of enterprise doctrine in and of
itself.
B. Destruction of Plaintiff Remedies
As discussed above, 134 destruction of the plaintiffs' remedies is another
rationale sometimes invoked to justify the imposition of expanded successor
liability.135 In the present case, Nissen purchased Tredex in such a fashion that
While garnishment is generally used as a method to satisfy a claim that is not paid,
there is no reason that some percentage of a corporation's profits could not be diverted into
an account for the benefit of the injured plaintiff.
133 See generally Eliot M. Blake, Rwnors of CHss: Considering The Insurance Crisis
and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY LJ. 401 (1988); Neil K. Komesar,
Injuries and Insttutions: Tort Re fo, Tor Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23
(1990); John P. Marshall, The Battle at Little Big Horn Has Moved to Raleigh-Is This
Custer's Last Stand Against Tor Reform?, 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 439 (1988). Each article
discusses troubled aspects of the tort system and various proposals for reform.
134 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
135 For several cases which discuss destruction of plaintiff's remedies as a basis for
liability, see Holloway v. John L. Smith's Son's Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977);
Phillips v. Cooper, Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Lundell v. Sidney Mach.
Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co.,
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Tredex was required to dissolve within five years. 136 The fact that the
corporation was in existence for five years, presumably for the specific purpose
of dealing with any litigation that might arise after the sale,137 mitigates against
the use of this rationale in this case.
C. The Conduit Theory
The final theory that the lVissen court did not take into account is the
conduit theory.' 38 The conduit theory is simple and succinct; it expressly
accepts that the successor corporation is not in any way responsible for the tort
of its predecessor. 139 Facing the reality of leaving a plaintiff without remedy,
some courts choose to use the successor as a conduit by discounting the price
of sale by the amount of predicted future products liability. 14° The Msen case
is an excellent situation for the application of the conduit theory. The Nissen
Corporation, when negotiating the deal with Tredex, could have attempted to
take into account future products liability that might occur after the five year
period, and discount the purchase price by that figure. Nissen would essentially
be acting as a conduit, funneling the risk of loss back to the Tredex
Corporation by a reduction in purchase price. The fact that there was an
express agreement that Tredex would continue for five years after the sale
suggests that future product liability was thought to be highly likely. Also, the
Nissen Corporation undoubtedly had full access to the records of Tredex
relating to accidents, law suits, and other relevant factors. Given all of these
factors, it would not have been too onerous a burden to place a requirement on
the Nissen Corporation to factor into the purchase price possible litigation costs
after the five year period. The fact that Nissen had all of the information
available and chose not to do so, should not result in an innocent plaintiff
suffering from the oversight of a corporation.
220 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 567 A.2d
598 (NJ. 1989); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826 (NJ. 1981); Tiff v.
Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1982).
136 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
137 Nissen v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564,565 (Md. 1991).
138 See generally id.
139 Green, supra note 19, at 30-33.
140 Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The question whether the continuity of enterprise doctrine should gain
further acceptance or continuing rejection is a difficult one to answer. As the
discussion of the various rationales (both supporting and undercutting the
doctrine) shows, there are serious repercussions no matter which way the
judicial pendulum swings.
Yet, given that the central tenet of our tort system is to compensate the
injured party, even if we must go to heretofore unthought of lengths, an
eventual acceptance of continuity of enterprise seems inevitable. Tort reform is
a growing and pervasive movement. 141 It is certain that reform in this area will
eventually be instituted. With the introduction of a cap on damages, and the
possibility of alternative systems of compensation, 142 there is no reason that
our legal system should not continue to expand remedies to those who are
injured by a defective product. In the meantime, courts should carefully
scrutinize all of the available rationales and justifications for the imposition of
liability. If there is any possibility to equitably compensate the plaintiff, these
steps should be taken.
Continuity of enterprise is a doctrine that obviously still has some
problems, but its acceptance should continue. Between a blameless individual
and a corporation who at least had the opportunity to bargain against future
product liability suits, the corporation should be made to bear the cost. The
court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston,143 summed up the issue succinctly
when, after accepting the continuity of enterprise doctrine, it stated, "[t]he
decision of the court simply means that the seller and purchaser corporations
will not both be able to profit by cutting off liability for damages to battered
and maimed people." 144
James W. Maxson
141 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
144 Id. at 802.
1993]

